LBJ’s Vietnam Fighting Escalation in 1964, 3 months before the election
by Bill Carico
(5 minute read)
Note: In English, the two syllables are usually combined into one word, "Vietnam". However, "Viet Nam" was once common usage and is still used by the United Nations and by the Vietnamese government.
After the fighting in Viet Nam escalated in 1964 on false reports of an attack on U.S.ships by North Vietnam, over 50,000 Americans died in Vietnam in the years that followed:
From Wikipedia: At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War (ISBN 0-89141-821-0) is a 2004 autobiographical book about Thomas C. Reed's experience at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory through his time as an advisor to President Ronald Reagan. It reveals new details about the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Farewell Dossier, and other facets of the Cold War.
Excerpts from P.148-151:
The Events of Aug 4, 1964
The US government was now suspicious of any North Vietnamese naval activity. Or was it looking for an excuse? On August 4th we intercepted a message from the North Vietnamese at Port Wallut. It directed another attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats but on what? Where? The US assumed the objective was a return engagement with the Maddox. But was it? Or was their target to be the fleet of Nasties operating in that same area?
[Nasties was the nickname for a 75 ton gunboat equipped with torpedo's provided by our CIA to fight in the harbors of North Vietnam]
Word was flashed to the Ticonderoga, then to Stockdale. As he readied for take off, his wing man developed engine trouble, so Stockdale requested permission to go it alone. Flying alone at night is contrary to navy regulations but he was the best. The skipper, Captain Hutch Cooper, approved the launch and Stockdale was off into the night. He was to look for intruders. He heard the Maddox and Turner Joy exchange radio messages about targets in the water north of them. Within minutes Stockdale was there. Even though it was the dead of night, the wakes of those two destroyers "Stood out like spotlights," as Stockdale puts it now.
The entire Gulf of Tonkin was awash with bioluminescence during that hot summer month.
Storms or schools of fish will make tropical water sparkle, But on the night of August 4th the wakes of the destroyers were visible from miles away. When Stockdale arrived over those ships, He could read the notes on his knee pad by the reflected light of those wakes. As he closed on the Maddox and Turner Joy, he could see they were firing. But at what? He dropped down to skim the waves at an altitude of a few hundred feet, but he saw nothing. The five-inch shells from the destroyers were sending up water spouts all around him... but there were no attacking PTs. Their wakes would have lit up the gulf like beacons, but aside from the US destroyers, the sea was dark. Stockdale crossed back-and-forth, all around the destroyers, to make sure. He did not want to leave the scene any sooner than absolutely necessary, for if the destroyers were under attack, it was up to him and him alone, to protect them. If they were not under attack, he was the only eyewitness to that fact. And that was the fact. No North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the Maddox or the Turner Joy on the night of August 4.
Now dangerously short of fuel, Stockdale nursed his F-8 back to the Ticonderoga. The skipper offered to send up a refueling aircraft. "Thanks, no," was the reply. " I don't have enough fuel even for that. I'll just do it right the first time."
The landing signal officer who would orchestrate the landing from on deck was an old friend and flying chum, Tim Hubbard. "You're looking good, Skipper," he said. "Keep coming down and catch that wire." Stockdale...caught the last hook that stood between him and the icy deep. Five minutes later he was in the ready room, warm and dry, the butt of laughter by his buddies. He had been on a flight to nowhere. Stockdale, through the Ticonderoga's skipper, sent an "All is Quiet" message to the National Military Command Center in Washington, then turned in for a good night's sleep. But not for long.
A PREORDAINED RESPONSE
At 9:20 AM, Washington time, on August 4 --- 9:20 PM aboard the Ticonderoga just as Stockdale was taking off on his first search for intruders--- The White House situation room learned that North Vietnam had authorized a raid of some sort, on something, by it's Swatow and PT boats. The president talked to his Secretary of Defense on the secure phone, asking McNamara how long it would take to retaliate if such a raid had in fact occurred. The Joint Chiefs responded that aircraft from the Ticonderoga and Constellation could strike targets in North Vietnam by 6 PM that evening, Washington time. Soon afterward, the White House press office notified the TV networks of a pending presidential statement, to be released in time for their 7:00 PM news shows. This advisory was issued even though there had been no attacks on the Maddox or Turner Joy, nor had any retaliatory raid been approved.
Later that night, Stockdale was put in charge of planning and leading one retaliatory strike, by aircraft from the Ticonderoga, against the POL facilities at Vinh.
That city of 44000, on the coast of North Vietnam, was home to about 1/3 of North Vietnam's total inventory of petroleum supplies. The raid was beautifully planned, utilizing 16 aircraft armed with bombs, rockets, and cannon. None of the aircraft were armed with defense munitions with which to fend off capital MiG interceptors, as Stockdale was counting on surprise to get his men in-and-out safely. "This raid is a replay of Pearl Harbor," he told his pilots. So it came as a great shock as they left their ready room to be told that a half hour before, in Washington, President Johnson had told the public of the raids still being planned.
The logistics of mounting the proposed strikes delayed their execution until well past the TV deadlines back home. Johnson grew anxious as 7 PM came and went. When he missed the 11 PM news, also the deadline for the major East Coast newspaper's, he vented his anger to McNamara: "Bob, I'm exposed here! I've got to make my speech right now." At 11:36 PM East Coast time, president Johnson took to the air. He announced the strikes still in the planning process aboard the Ticonderoga and another carrier, the Constellation, now also at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. The President had blown Stockdale's element of surprise. His aircraft were headed into North Vietnam with no defensive armaments of any kind.
The strike on Vinh was executed with only 90 seconds spent over the target. A similar raid, from the Constellation, bombarded naval facilities at Ben Thuy, Quang Khe, Hon Me, and Hon Gai. There was mayhem below, but the US also suffered casualties in the skies. Lieutenant Richard C. Sather, aboard an A-1 dive bomber, was killed by antiaircraft fire. Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, flying in an A-4 Skyhawk, was shot down but survived. He became the first airborne POW in the war against North Vietnam, spending eight and a half dreadful years in captivity.
It is hard to tell whether President Johnson's premature announcement tipped off the anti aircraft gunners along the coast of North Vietnam, but it is clear that Johnson attached a higher priority to his own image and poll ratings than he did to the safety of his Warriors overseas. And there was no doubt in Jim Stockdale's mind, as he looked down at the huge fireballs where the coastal town Vinh once stood, that the US involvement in Vietnam was irretrievably on.
THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
To make the new war legal, a congressional resolution was needed. A preliminary draft, giving president Johnson war powers, had been in the works since may 1964, away or, awaiting only the right crisis to give it life. Give it life. By the time Stockdale was having supper aboard the Ticonderoga on the evening of August 4th, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was on the floor of the House of Representatives, introduced by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations with a notation that the President wanted congressional action the same day. Pausing only to hear assurances from Secretary of State Rusk, secretary of defense McNamara, and JCS chairman Wheeler that US ships really had been attacked, the house passed the resolution without a dissenting vote on August 6th [emphasis mine] It was approved by the US senate with only 2 dissenting votes and no debate the following day, August 7th. The die was cast.
In November 1964, Lyndon Johnson was elected in his own right to the presidency of the United States. He won in a landslide. At the end of the year, Johnson had the political power and the legal authority to deal with Vietnam as he saw fit.
WITH THE ELECTION OVER, INTO THE QUAGMIRE
On March 8, 1965, 3,500 US Marines waded ashore at Da Nang, South Vietnam. On June 18 the war turned to heavy bombardment with the introduction of B-52s…
On November 14 the first bloody set-piece battle between the opposing armies of the United States and North Vietnam took place in the Ia Drang Valley, with 234 Americans killed, and North Vietnamese casualties probably ten times that.
By the end of the year the American public was growing concerned; antiwar rhetoric and demonstrations were starting. There ensued a decade of jungle warfare and aerial bombardment. None of it conclusive; much was mismanaged…consuming the lives of a dozen young Americans every day for ten dreary years… 58,000 Amerians, their names now engraved on a black marble slab, made payment for our leaders’ folly in full.
(End of excerpts “At The Abyss”)
‐—-----------‐‐—-----
by Bill Carico
(5 minute read)
Note: In English, the two syllables are usually combined into one word, "Vietnam". However, "Viet Nam" was once common usage and is still used by the United Nations and by the Vietnamese government.
After the fighting in Viet Nam escalated in 1964 on false reports of an attack on U.S.ships by North Vietnam, over 50,000 Americans died in Vietnam in the years that followed:
From Wikipedia: At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War (ISBN 0-89141-821-0) is a 2004 autobiographical book about Thomas C. Reed's experience at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory through his time as an advisor to President Ronald Reagan. It reveals new details about the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Farewell Dossier, and other facets of the Cold War.
Excerpts from P.148-151:
The Events of Aug 4, 1964
The US government was now suspicious of any North Vietnamese naval activity. Or was it looking for an excuse? On August 4th we intercepted a message from the North Vietnamese at Port Wallut. It directed another attack by North Vietnamese patrol boats but on what? Where? The US assumed the objective was a return engagement with the Maddox. But was it? Or was their target to be the fleet of Nasties operating in that same area?
[Nasties was the nickname for a 75 ton gunboat equipped with torpedo's provided by our CIA to fight in the harbors of North Vietnam]
Word was flashed to the Ticonderoga, then to Stockdale. As he readied for take off, his wing man developed engine trouble, so Stockdale requested permission to go it alone. Flying alone at night is contrary to navy regulations but he was the best. The skipper, Captain Hutch Cooper, approved the launch and Stockdale was off into the night. He was to look for intruders. He heard the Maddox and Turner Joy exchange radio messages about targets in the water north of them. Within minutes Stockdale was there. Even though it was the dead of night, the wakes of those two destroyers "Stood out like spotlights," as Stockdale puts it now.
The entire Gulf of Tonkin was awash with bioluminescence during that hot summer month.
Storms or schools of fish will make tropical water sparkle, But on the night of August 4th the wakes of the destroyers were visible from miles away. When Stockdale arrived over those ships, He could read the notes on his knee pad by the reflected light of those wakes. As he closed on the Maddox and Turner Joy, he could see they were firing. But at what? He dropped down to skim the waves at an altitude of a few hundred feet, but he saw nothing. The five-inch shells from the destroyers were sending up water spouts all around him... but there were no attacking PTs. Their wakes would have lit up the gulf like beacons, but aside from the US destroyers, the sea was dark. Stockdale crossed back-and-forth, all around the destroyers, to make sure. He did not want to leave the scene any sooner than absolutely necessary, for if the destroyers were under attack, it was up to him and him alone, to protect them. If they were not under attack, he was the only eyewitness to that fact. And that was the fact. No North Vietnamese PT boats attacked the Maddox or the Turner Joy on the night of August 4.
Now dangerously short of fuel, Stockdale nursed his F-8 back to the Ticonderoga. The skipper offered to send up a refueling aircraft. "Thanks, no," was the reply. " I don't have enough fuel even for that. I'll just do it right the first time."
The landing signal officer who would orchestrate the landing from on deck was an old friend and flying chum, Tim Hubbard. "You're looking good, Skipper," he said. "Keep coming down and catch that wire." Stockdale...caught the last hook that stood between him and the icy deep. Five minutes later he was in the ready room, warm and dry, the butt of laughter by his buddies. He had been on a flight to nowhere. Stockdale, through the Ticonderoga's skipper, sent an "All is Quiet" message to the National Military Command Center in Washington, then turned in for a good night's sleep. But not for long.
A PREORDAINED RESPONSE
At 9:20 AM, Washington time, on August 4 --- 9:20 PM aboard the Ticonderoga just as Stockdale was taking off on his first search for intruders--- The White House situation room learned that North Vietnam had authorized a raid of some sort, on something, by it's Swatow and PT boats. The president talked to his Secretary of Defense on the secure phone, asking McNamara how long it would take to retaliate if such a raid had in fact occurred. The Joint Chiefs responded that aircraft from the Ticonderoga and Constellation could strike targets in North Vietnam by 6 PM that evening, Washington time. Soon afterward, the White House press office notified the TV networks of a pending presidential statement, to be released in time for their 7:00 PM news shows. This advisory was issued even though there had been no attacks on the Maddox or Turner Joy, nor had any retaliatory raid been approved.
Later that night, Stockdale was put in charge of planning and leading one retaliatory strike, by aircraft from the Ticonderoga, against the POL facilities at Vinh.
That city of 44000, on the coast of North Vietnam, was home to about 1/3 of North Vietnam's total inventory of petroleum supplies. The raid was beautifully planned, utilizing 16 aircraft armed with bombs, rockets, and cannon. None of the aircraft were armed with defense munitions with which to fend off capital MiG interceptors, as Stockdale was counting on surprise to get his men in-and-out safely. "This raid is a replay of Pearl Harbor," he told his pilots. So it came as a great shock as they left their ready room to be told that a half hour before, in Washington, President Johnson had told the public of the raids still being planned.
The logistics of mounting the proposed strikes delayed their execution until well past the TV deadlines back home. Johnson grew anxious as 7 PM came and went. When he missed the 11 PM news, also the deadline for the major East Coast newspaper's, he vented his anger to McNamara: "Bob, I'm exposed here! I've got to make my speech right now." At 11:36 PM East Coast time, president Johnson took to the air. He announced the strikes still in the planning process aboard the Ticonderoga and another carrier, the Constellation, now also at the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. The President had blown Stockdale's element of surprise. His aircraft were headed into North Vietnam with no defensive armaments of any kind.
The strike on Vinh was executed with only 90 seconds spent over the target. A similar raid, from the Constellation, bombarded naval facilities at Ben Thuy, Quang Khe, Hon Me, and Hon Gai. There was mayhem below, but the US also suffered casualties in the skies. Lieutenant Richard C. Sather, aboard an A-1 dive bomber, was killed by antiaircraft fire. Lieutenant Everett Alvarez, flying in an A-4 Skyhawk, was shot down but survived. He became the first airborne POW in the war against North Vietnam, spending eight and a half dreadful years in captivity.
It is hard to tell whether President Johnson's premature announcement tipped off the anti aircraft gunners along the coast of North Vietnam, but it is clear that Johnson attached a higher priority to his own image and poll ratings than he did to the safety of his Warriors overseas. And there was no doubt in Jim Stockdale's mind, as he looked down at the huge fireballs where the coastal town Vinh once stood, that the US involvement in Vietnam was irretrievably on.
THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
To make the new war legal, a congressional resolution was needed. A preliminary draft, giving president Johnson war powers, had been in the works since may 1964, away or, awaiting only the right crisis to give it life. Give it life. By the time Stockdale was having supper aboard the Ticonderoga on the evening of August 4th, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was on the floor of the House of Representatives, introduced by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Relations with a notation that the President wanted congressional action the same day. Pausing only to hear assurances from Secretary of State Rusk, secretary of defense McNamara, and JCS chairman Wheeler that US ships really had been attacked, the house passed the resolution without a dissenting vote on August 6th [emphasis mine] It was approved by the US senate with only 2 dissenting votes and no debate the following day, August 7th. The die was cast.
In November 1964, Lyndon Johnson was elected in his own right to the presidency of the United States. He won in a landslide. At the end of the year, Johnson had the political power and the legal authority to deal with Vietnam as he saw fit.
WITH THE ELECTION OVER, INTO THE QUAGMIRE
On March 8, 1965, 3,500 US Marines waded ashore at Da Nang, South Vietnam. On June 18 the war turned to heavy bombardment with the introduction of B-52s…
On November 14 the first bloody set-piece battle between the opposing armies of the United States and North Vietnam took place in the Ia Drang Valley, with 234 Americans killed, and North Vietnamese casualties probably ten times that.
By the end of the year the American public was growing concerned; antiwar rhetoric and demonstrations were starting. There ensued a decade of jungle warfare and aerial bombardment. None of it conclusive; much was mismanaged…consuming the lives of a dozen young Americans every day for ten dreary years… 58,000 Amerians, their names now engraved on a black marble slab, made payment for our leaders’ folly in full.
(End of excerpts “At The Abyss”)
‐—-----------‐‐—-----